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A lecture delivered by 
Professor Walter L. Wright, Jr. 
at the Naval War College 
February 23, 1949 
Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the person who in­
troduces you as a lecturer not only state the text on which you 
are to speak but also the conclusion at which you are going to ar­
rive. This is not entirely astonishing to me because I am aware 
that the Straits of the Bosporous and the Dardanelles have been 
househO'ld words in the Navy Department ever since 1800, when 
Admiral Bainbridge very unwillingly sailed the Washington up 
through those straits and passed the batteries on the Dardanelles. 
To carry you back for a moment to the days of sail (which 
I understand is not always unwelcome to sailors), Bainbridge was 
ordered by the Dey of Algiers to take a special emissary to his 
overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey threatened to blow the 
Washington out of the sea with his shore batteries if Bainbridge 
refused. He therefore started under duress flying the Algerian 
flag, but as soon as he got out of range of the batteries he 
sent a sailor up the mast and took the flag down, and there­
after he sailed under the Stars and Stripes. When he got to the 
entrance of the Dardanelles, where there were great forts on 
either side, he knew that a strange and unknown flag would be 
fired upon. He wasn't going to strike the American flag so he 
had to find a solution. The solution was this: he headed straight 
in toward the anchorage near one of these forts, and as he 
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went in he began furling sail and firing a salute. Of course the 
salute was fired with black powder and there was plenty of smoke. 
As soon as he had a good smoke screen in the air, he began un­
furling sail, and the first thing the Turkish artillerymen on shore 
knew, the Washington under full sail was emerging from her 
cloud of smoke, already out of range of their guns, which were 
in fixed emplacements and couldn't be shifted as the ship moved. 
So, to American sailors, these are familiar waters-the Darda­
nelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous. You don't need, 
therefore, to be told a great deal about the general strategic 
importance of Turkey, which is the possessor of these narrow 
seas, these straits leading from the Black Sea into the Aegean. 
There has been a good deal of talk since 1939 to the ef­
fect that these straits have lost their importance; that the range 
of air bombardment is such that the Aegean Sea in itself is a suf­
ficiently narrow area to make the use of naval forces in any great 
number impossible, and there is, of course, a good deal of truth in 
this statement. Certainly the Aegean Sea, which is nowhere more 
than two hundred miles wide, offers very little opportunity for 
maneuver when you can get an air force out there any hour of the 
day. On the other hand, the crucial point within this narrow area 
has simply been lengthened by the addition of air force and the pos­
sibility of air attack. The tightest point in the long narrow passage 
is still the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Marmara and 
into the Aegean. 
I suppose that it's appropriate to mention one major 
strategic point which I will refer to later. From the point of view 
of those who are most concerned with the straits, their major im­
portance formerly was that behind the straits lay a body of water 
large enough for the training of a massive fleet, which might, if 
the straits were opened to it, emerge fully prepared for battle in 
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the Mediterranean or even in the Atlantic. That was the basic 
consideration, undoubtedly, in British naval thinking in the nine­
teenth century. I think it's still true. It's still true, but it is also 
true that, in 'order to have this facility, a power which might build 
such a fleet (which might be at the present time the Soviet Union) 
would have to possess far more territory than merely the straits 
themselves. It would be necessary for that power to possess at least 
the coasts of Asiatic Turkey, because only in that way could it 
provide the necessary air cover for its ships going from the Aegean 
to the Eastern Mediterranean. Some of these points will come up 
again later so I shall not unduly stress them at the present moment. 
·' .
The country, Turkey, with which I'tn dealing this morning 
is by present day count a small country. It has approximately the 
same area as the two American states of California and Montana. 
The area is about two hundred and ninety four thousand square 
miles, and those two states are a little bit larger than that. It has 
very much the same topography. If you look at the map, you'll 
realize that all of the coast of Turkey is mountainous, that the en­
tire peninsula is surrounded by a wall of mountains, and on the 
seaward side of those mountains there are a certain number of 
plains, for the most part small plains, and in many cases very bad­
ly connected with the interior of the country. Only one of the 
major sea-c�asts of Turkey has any good ports in it. On the en­
tire northern coast, on the Black Sea, there is not one single port 
which could accommodate a naval vessel of any importance what­
soever. There is a great dearth even of beaches which could be 
19 used for beach landings. The northern coastal range of mountains 
starting with Mount Olympus, which rises to a height of eighty four 
hundred feet, continues to rise in height all the way along, up to the 
Caucasus peaks, thirteen to fourteen thousand feet high. Of course 
the final high point of the country is Mt. Ararat which is ap­
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From Istanbul, in the Bosphorus, down to the southwestern
corner of the peninsula you have a great succession of very fine
natural ports. There is only one developed port (and when I say 
developed, I use the word with reservation) and that is the partial­
ly developed port of Izmir, formerly called Smyrna. 
On the southern coast again you have a mountain range 
running right along the shore, and no developed ports whatever un­
til you get down to Alexandretta (which the Turks call Iskender'." 
un) in the extreme south corner-the southern extension of 
Turkey.· 
Now you realize from looking at the map that the mass of 
the population is in the Aegean river valleys which are very fertile. 
This is the region of Smyrna figs and Smyrna raisins. There is also a 
. thick population along the Black Sea coast, in spite of the fact that 
there is only a small amount of arable ground. That is because this 
region is the only region in Turkey which has a very heavy rain­
fall. In the extreme eastern part of the Black Sea coast you have a 
rainfall such as you have in Sitka, Alaska-extremely heavy rain­
fall with rain practically every day. 
The communcations from the coasts to the interior of Turkey 
are, by modern reckoning, very poor at every point, but the best 
communications that .do exist are rail communicatons and we have 
these running in from the port of Alexandretta, then through the 
Cilician plain and through the great Taurus mountain range up 
into the central plateau. Between Mersin on the Cilician coast and 
Smyrna there is no railway reaching the sea. Between Smyrna and 
Istanbul, there is no other railway connecting a port with the in­
terior. Along the Black Sea coast there are two railways running 
from the coast inland. One starts at Zonguldak, which is the area 
in which Turkish .coal is produced. Here is a very sizeable coal 
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field, with a very adequate quality of bituminous coal. The rail­
way runs from there up to the capital of the country, high on the 
interior plateau at Ankara. A second railway starting from Sam­
sun, the great tobacco port on the Black Sea, connects with the 
internal system of railways which form a sort of very loose net 
around practically the whole country. 
You realize, then, that this peninsula, surrounded by 
mountains on every side, with narrow coastal plains, with few 
communications with the interior, with very few ports of any con­
sequence, is not what you would call exactly an attractive place on 
which one could1and forces in the face of opposition. Nevertheless, 
unattractive as it is, it's an area which must be studied. It must 
be studied, basically because of the position which it occupies in 
the world. Turkey is a finger pointing westward. It lies at the 
point where Asia and Europe meet; it lies surrounded by seas; 
it has as central a location in the geography of the world as any 
country you could mention. It's not marginal, it isn't merely on 
the edge of the Asiatic continent. It is the link which joins the 
Asiatic continent to Europe which is, itself, nothing more than 
a peninsula of the vast mass of Asia. 
You know your maps, I'm sure, as well as I, so it's hardly 
appropriate for me to enlarge too much on this fact. But I think 
it's well to call your attention to the increase in the importance 
of this territory as a result of modern developments in warfare. As 
I pictured it to you, it is obviously a sort of a natural fortress. Not 
only is it surrounded by mountains, but it is large enough to have 
within that wall of mountains plenty of room for the building of 
airfields-for the servicing of armies. In other words, it is a big 
enough fortress to serve as a base of operations in any direction­
and the directions which are attractive are very obvious. 
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obvious that one of the most important things we have to do is use 
our imagination and put ourselves in the position of the people 
with whom we may have violent disagreements. From the point 
of view of the Kremlin, here is this potentially great fortress, 
lying about two hundred miles from Russian territory across the 
Black Sea. Not just any Russan territory, but the industrial heart 
of Russia, built around the Donets coal basin. That two to three 
hundred miles is no distance at all from the point of view of mod­
ern bombing, as you are very well aware. Not only is that a very 
vulnerable part of Russia which would be in danger of attack if 
Turkey were in unfriendly hands, but, no further away from 
Turkish territory and on the western shore of the Caspian Sea 
is the greatest of the existing Russian oil fields, the great Baku. oil 
field. It isn't producing what it did a few years ago, but, so far 
as we know, it is still the major producing oil field of Russia. These 
are very vital objectives, and I think it is very apparent, there­
fore, why the Soviet Union is anxious to make sure that Turkey 
is not being used as the base for an attack, nor in a position to be 
used as a base for an attack, on the Soviet Union. And, pushing 
that just a little bit further, it is also clear why it would be a. 
great advantage to Russia if Turkey were in Russia's possession, 
a satellite state, or under Russian domination. Because, just 
as bombing planes could operate from Turkish territory, just as 
navies could operate through the straits into the Black Sea (as they 
did in the Crimean War-the one case in modern times in which 
Russia was successfully invaded)-by the same token, this fort­
ress, being just as defensible from the south and east as it is from 
the north and west, could be the base for large scale air, land, 
and sea operations. 
It's a bit farther from Turkey to the Persian Gulf and its 
great reservoir of oil (at least 40% of the world's known oil sup­
ply is in that area) but it's not beyond effective bombing range 
20 
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of Turkish territory. The Mosul oil field is practically in sight of 
the Turkish frontier (I must say, within sight of a highly mount­
ainous area with very little land on which airfields could be built, 
but nevertheless within easy range of other areas from which air 
attacks might be mounted). 
The possession, then, of this territory by either of two op� 
posing world powers (the Soviet Union or the United States) 
would be a peril to the other. And I think it's only fair to follow 
our imagination a little further and say that the policies of the 
United States with respect to Turkey must be governed to a con­
siderable degree by the foreseeable reactions to this or that move 
which we can expect the RussiaI).s to have. Consequently you 
are brought to this conclusion: if the United States embarked on 
a policy of the kind of imperialism which we called "old fashioned," 
and undertook, through annoyance with the inefficiency of the 
native inhabitants or for some other reason, to take over and op­
erate Turkey, all Russian statesmen and strategists would have 
a completely legitimate feeling that we were threatening their se­
curity. Therefore, it is obviously appropriate that we should make 
every effort, while maintaining our security in this area, not to 
push our policy to the point where the Soviet planners and strate­
gists would have legitimate grounds to feel that we were aiming 
a dagger at their heart (an expression which they would no doubt 
come to use). 
I'm happy to say that, up to the present time, the policy 
which the United States has followed with respect to Turkey has 
been along the lines which I have just explained. The policy of 
the United States has been to form what is, in effect, an informal 
alliance with Turkey. It is an alliance which doesn't require that we 
send military forces to this or that point, under this or that contin­
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being on our side in any dispute between ourselves and the Soviet 
Union. Therefore it is to our interest to have this small country in a 
position to defend itself against attack which might come from the 
Soviet Union. Consequently, the couple of hundred million dollars of 
aid to Turkey which the United States is paying, is being used to 
build up the defensive strength of the Turkish Republic. Some 
of it is being used for longer range, and some for shorter range 
purposes. 
One of the most long range is the appropriation which is 
being spent on the improvement of Turkish road communications 
and transportation. There, our representatives have been able to 
persuade the Turkish government to spend the ten million dollars 
appropriated almost entirely for road making machinery; whereas 
the Turkish government itself, from its own local resources, is pro­
viding the labor and the material necessary for the construction 
of a system of highways. This program will not make Turkey a 
country like Rhode Island or Connecticut from the point of view 
of roads, but will represent several hundred percent improvement 
in the existing situation. 
So our relations with Turkey amount, at the present time, to 
an informal alliance. Now, if Turkey is an ally, it's very fair to ask, 
"What kind of an ally?" I'll give you an example of what I mean. 
In 1914, Russia had an ally in Serbia, and the adventurous policy 
which was followed by the Serbian government led to a world war 
in which the Russian empire was destroyed. We, in our relations 
with Turkey, are in a somewhat similar position: here is a small 
nation which is our ally; what kind of an ally? If that ally follows 
an adventurous policy, the first thing we know we are going to find 
ourselves involved in its quarrels with its neighbors-quarrels 
which may not be of any particular int.erest to us, just as it was 
of no immediate importance to the Russian government in 1914 
to have the Archduke of Austria assassinated in Sarajevo. 
22 
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I'm merely bringing this out to show you how dangerous the 
small ally can be to the greater ally. As far as Turkey is concerned, 
the most important fact in this connection is that the men who are 
ruling Turkey at the present time are ruling that small country 
with the wisdom which they acquired in the process of losing a 
large empire. The statesmen of Turkey are not peasants; they 
are not newcomers on the scene of international politics; they, as 
they would put it themselves, are "well cooked". They know their 
business: they know what works in international politics; and they 
know what doesn't work. They are very well aware that the worst 
thing they could do, granted the informal nature of their alliance 
with the United States, would be to stir up unnecessary friction 
with their neighbors {particularly with the Soviet Union). In our 
own country, with our foreign policy dependent upon public opin­
ion-not just on the decisions of a few people in positions of high 
command-we might be faced by the question "Will we save this 
small ally from its own mistakes; will we go to war in a cause for 
which we have very little sympathy?" Well, you and I know what 
the answer would be. Under those circumstances, the United 
States wouldn't go to war; the American people are not that kind of 
warmongers. They've been accused of it from the other side of the 
Atlantic and the Urals, but they are not that kind of war makers. 
Fortunately the men who are operating the Turkish. state are fully 
aware of this, and they are determined to follow a policy with 
respect to their greater and smaller neighbors which is one hun­
dred percent "correct" in the diplomatic sense. They are not going 
to start any unnecessary rows. 
What are the aims and policies, the resources and population 
of the Turks? They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they have a 
country capable of supporting a much larger population than is at 
present in Turkey, and at a much higher standard of living than 
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ment of their resources. I've used the word development, and I 
think it should be defined a little more closely. What kind of de­
velopment, what kind of ideals, do these people have before them, 
of the society into which they want to develop? What kind of 
nation do they want to be? A decision was reached by them 
twenty-five years ago. At that time they chose between the so­
'Ciety sponsored by Russia and the sort of society which Western 
Europe and the United States represented. During the interven­
ing years they have consistently maintained the same point of 
view. What they want, as a people, is to become a nation like the 
highly developed nations of Western Europe or like the United 
States. They have no territorial ambitions at the present time. 
They don't want to take any land from their neighbors. They want 
to live, to survive in peace, to develop their resources, to work out 
the many problems with which they are faced internally and be­
come a nation as much like this country as they are able to become. 
We are, to a certain extent, responsible for their having 
this point of view. I hope that, since I was president of the Ameri­
can colleges in Turkey, I may be allowed to do a little advertising 
for a moment. The existence of American schools and colleges, 
paid for by Americans (first by missionary-minded Americans and 
later by the simple humanitarian type of benefactor and philan­
thropist) has had a good deal to do with persuading the Turkish 
people that they want to live the way Americans and British and 
Western Europeans live. 
Well, I've spoken again and again of the people. There are 
about eighteen million people living in Turkey, and all of them 
haven't been Turks. They have at present in their country, a num­
ber of minorities. The one which is large enough to be significant, 
amounting to a million and a half people out of the eighteen mil­
lion, is the Kurdish minority. The Kurd tribesmen speak a language 
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related to Persian. Each tribe has been an independent nation 
ever since the beginning of history. They live in the territory 
extending from a point near Alexandretta out to the Russian 
frontier. They comprise about one million and a half people, living 
mostly in the mountains. No previous Turkish government, in fact 
no government of any kind, had ever subdued these people. Their 
mountains were so rugged, and so high, and so miserably poor, 
that it wasn't worth the investment in money and lives necessary 
to subdue these people. The Turkish Republic, however, has sub­
dued them, that is, all of those who live within Turkey . There are 
considerable groups, half a million or more, living in Iran and Iraq. 
But those living in Turkey are completely subjected at the present 
time. They are not only subjected, but the Turks, with that wis­
dom which they learned from losing an empire, having subdued 
them in the military sense, having occupied every valley and every 
hamlet in the whole country with considerable cost of life, then 
said to the Kurds, "Now you are licked, you are Turks." It is the 
same policy, in general, which the British government followed 
in dealing with the Boers in South Africa, but proving in Turkey 
much more effective tha:11 any one had thought possible. 
I travelled through that entire country last summer; talked 
with hundreds of people in the region, and I came away with the 
impression that the one big minority problem of Turkey is licked 
and that within a few years there won't be any people in Turkey 
who consider themselves Kurds. The young men are all going 
into the military service and they like it. They come back proud 
of their service ribbons. They come back with the title of Sergeant, 
which they wear throughout life. They tell the people in the 
mountain villages in which the governments have forced them to 
settle, "We are smarter than the Turks are; we should all go out 
into Western Turkey and make our fortunes and then come back 
here and live happily." They have come to think of themselves 
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There are other minorities; one consists of Greek-speaking
people, about one hundred thousand, all of whom live near or in 
the city of Istanbul or Constantinople. An Armenian-speaking
minority live in the same area, and the eighty thousand or more 
Jews in the country are scattered through a few of the larger 
- cities. The Greeks, who are not noted for their love of Turks,
nevertheless regard conditions in Turkey today (and quite right­
ly so) as much superior to conditions in Greece at the present
moment. They are not making any effort to leave, or making any
trouble in Turkey.
The Armenians are in an extremely difficult position. They 
are not regarded as first-class citizens (any more than the Greeks 
or Jews are) in this Moslem country, but there is not much they 
can do about it, so they are adjusting themselves to a position 
somewhat like that which the Negroes occupy in the United 
States. A good many Armenians were encouraged by the Soviet 
government to leave Turkey, to leave Syria, even . the United 
States, and go to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. I was up 
there in that region last summer (I don't mean on the Russian 
side of it but on the Turkish side) and I saw what was happening. 
A good many of these Armenians who have gone there as settlers 
in the Soviet-Armenian republic, flee from that country; they flee 
to Turkey for safety and security. If any of you know of the re..; 
lations between Turks and Armenians, you'll realize that the 
last place you would expect an Armenian to go, seeking security, 
is Turkey. That, perhaps, will give you some idea of how terrible 
conditions are within Soviet-Armenia. 
I'll take a moment to tell you what these people say­
these refugees. They say that on arrival at Batumi, on the Black 
Sea coast, they are immediately sent to labor camps. The younger 
children are separated and are sent to special schools; families are 
broken up. The older people, whom the Soviet-Communists don't 
26 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 7, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/3
RESTRICTED 
expect to be able to convert to whole-hearted Communism, are sent 
to labor camps where they get a full ration only if they do a full 
days work (and a full ration consists of bread and cabbage soup). 
In the various shifts around the country, all their goods were 
stolen from them. Several boasted, when they came into Turkey, 
that they were wearing suits which they had stolen from the 
Russian guards. Those who can do a good day's work get a full 
ration; those who can't, get a half ration, and they die of starva­
tion before long. A good many, who have enough ambition and 
energy left, try to escape, and they escape into Turkey. When they 
come to the frontier they find in most places a barbed wire fence 
to hold them in, and sentry boxes one hundred to one hundred and 
fifty meters apart with sentries who shoot anyone crossing the 
frontier. But, as is usually the case in these authoritarian regimes, 
the authorities can't trust their subordinates. And so another 
organization, other than the sentries, rakes the soil between these 
sentry posts every morning; rakes it so that it's smooth; then if 
they find any foot prints there, they shoot the sentries. Now 
the refugees who do get out, get out through that as well as all the 
other controls inside the country. That gives you some idea of 
what conditions must be like behind the frontier for these im­
migrants. 
I've spoken of the minority populations in Turkey. What 
about the politics of Turkey? Now politics is the business of power 
internally, within the country. What is the situation? Up until 
two and one half years ago, Turkey was ruled by one party, a 
monolithic party. It was ruled this way: the President of the Re­
public was also President of the Party. As President of the Party, 
he chose all the party's candidates for parliament. The members 
of parliament, whom he had chosen, elected him President. That's 
what you might call a complete circle; perhaps not a vicious one, 
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. between the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the police, 
and the officials of the party. The local governor in a province 
was appointed by the central government in Istanbul, not elected. 
Usually the local governor was also head of the local party or­
ganization. 
Two and one half years ago, Turkey was not as yet an in­
formal ally of the United States. Turkey had the idea of becom­
ing a Western country-Western in politics as well as in economy 
and society. But the people who were in charge of the government 
were not in a hurry to make any moves which would result in the 
loss of their jobs. They realized the status of General Franco in 
his relations with the United States, and of a few other countries 
with which alliance could not be contracted by the United States 
government because of the bad press which they enjoyed as a result 
of their having a fascist or semi-fascist type of regime. When the 
President of Turkey and his advisers realized the situation, they 
decided to move, more rapidly than they had planned, in the direc­
tion of a genuine democratic system. And consequently you had 
the emergence of a new party, the second party. This had been 
tried a couple of times in the past, but the results had not been 
happy for the people who tried it. This time the new party was 
founded under the leadership of a former Prime Minister, with 
the obvious approval and consent of the President of the Repub­
lic. Shortly thereafter, there was a general election. In that 
election the new party won only'about sixty members of the parlia­
ment, whereas the old established party won over three hundred 
members. The opposition party claimed that the elections were 
finagled-that there was all kinds of skull-duggery practiced. 
From what I was able to discover in talking to a great many 
people last summer, in the big coastal cities, where there were 
plenty of foreign observers around, the elections were absolutely 
honest. As you went away from the coast, and left the foreign 
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observers behind, there was increasing government police pressure 
upon people to vote in favor of the party in power. Those of 
you who have cruised around South American waters are very · 
familiar with the type of proceding which I am hinting at. The 
government saw to it, in other words, that there wasn't too much 
open scuffle, but that it was a good sized majority-in fact a very, 
very effective majority indeed. 
This has been done partly because of the aims of the Turk­
ish government and people, partly because of their desire to have 
a good press in the United States, in order to make alliance with 
Turkey possible not only for American soldiers and sailors but for 
the American man in the street. And they are succeeding; the 
process is going on, and I suspect that if you had an election 
tomorrow the opposition party would perhaps not win the election, 
but it would win a vastly larger number of the parliamentary 
seats. In Turkish politics, there is no argument on foreign pol­
icy. The foreign policy of all parties is identical. It calls for co­
operation with the United States and the allies of the United 
States, and for maintenance against every threat against the in­
dependence of the country. · 
Perhaps I might say a word here as to the morale of the 
Turkish people. The best illustration I can think of came from 
the newspaper yesterday. One of the leading writers of Turkey 
turned communist, was prosecuted and, when he was indicted, he 
disappeared. He was tried in absentia and condemned to three or 
· four months in prison. (I might say that all known communists in
Turkey are lodged permanently at government expense, in prison.
There are very few of them; they are not a great burden to the
finances.) This man disappeared and nothing was heard of him
until the police caught a man who made it his business to spirit
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gave the usual third degree treatment to this gentleman, they dis­
covered that he had killed this prominent writer. His story was 
that the prominent writer had come to him, offered him money 
to be taken over into Bulgaria. The brigand didn't know who his 
customer was until he got very close to the frontier, and then he 
said, "I realized suddenly that this was the wicked communist 
writer. I may have had some faults in the past but no one can 
claim that I'm not a patriotic Turk. Under these circumstances 
. what could I do? I couldn't take this man to a foreign country, 
where he could safely attack the fatherland, so I killed him." 
Now if the brigands and thieves talk this way, it gives you some 
idea of the force, of the determination, of these people to main­
tain themselves as an independent nation. I might say it turned 
out later, after this gentleman had received some more third de­
gree, that the writer had exhibited a very large roll of paper money 
which may have had· something to do with the murder. 
I shall not go on further with this, but I'll ask you to be­
lieve that the vast majority of these people, close to one hundred 
percent, are united, completely united, in foreign policy. The dif­
ferences between the political parties �re domestic differences about 
the rate at which changes should take place, about the kind of 
reforms that should be adopted, and so on. 
Now let's tu:rn to this question, "What does Turkey expect 
of its relations with the United States?" First of all they ex-. 
pect to get supplies, and they are getting them. They ·have bought 
largely war surplus material and· they got it very cheap indeed, 
at least in the earlier shipments. They want arms for their Army 
and Navy. Their Army is always going to be more important to 
them than either their Navy or Air Force, because they do not 
have the technical facilities, they don't have the industry to sup­
port as complicated an instrument as either a navy or an air force, 
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They can!-t build ships, they can't build airplanes and they can't
even repair them because of their lack of technological development.
What they expect of us in navy and air force is minimum weapons; 
enough to put on a show. Of course the Navy men want bigger and 
better ships, and they are always asking for them, but they don't 
really expect to get anything bigger than a light cruiser. They know 
that they couldn't make any real use of anything except destroyers, 
submarines, gunboats and that sort of thing. 
In the event of war between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the 
Turks don't expect massive American forces to be sent to their aid. 
They believe that their Army, which is obviously their strongest and 
most numerous group, if supplied with weapons and ammunition, 
and if provided with a moderate amount of air cover, will be able 
to defend the heart of the country until the Russians are so busy 
elsewhere that they will be able to stabilize the situation to Turkey's 
advantage. 
So if a crisis should arise, the first thing that the Turks 
would expect of us would be air support. And it's quite obvious that 
the kind of air support that they would expect, first of all, would be 
the kind that could be delivered on carriers. Whether or not it's 
feasible to send carrier aircraft there to operate in the Black Sea 
or short of the Black. Sea, is a technical question which you gentle­
men can answer much better than I .. 
What-would we expect from this informal alliance which 
seems to exist? Turkey, as you see, wants to survive; that's the 
motive all the way through. What we want, it seems to me, is first 
of all to keep Turkey out of the hands of the Soviet Union. If Turkey 
were occupied and held by the Soviets, the entire Eastern Mediter, 
ranean would be shut off as far as we are concerned. It would per, 
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territories around the Persian Gulf and, although we could fight a
war without that oil, we don't have any allies in Europe who could 
fight a war without the oil of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our 
first point is to keep Turkey within the area that we can do busi­
ness with and preclude the Russians' taking it over. 
More specific, what can we expect the Turks to do in a mili­
tary way? Again there are technical questions which you'll know 
better how to answer than I, but obviously it's going to take time; 
time is going to be an important factor. Can we so prepare the 
Turks that they could maintain themselves until such time as we 
could bring forces to the Persian Gulf area (which is the most vital 
of all these areas as far as I can see), so that we could bring forces 
there adequate to defend them even if the Turks were wiped out? 
That's a militarily important question, but evidentally we think 
there is some possibility, militarily, or else we wouldn't be engaged 
in sending arms to Turkey and in training Turkish officers and men 
for defense. 
Now another point, which I think is a very moot point but 
one which we should discuss and understand clearly. Although we 
have an arrangement with Greece, and an informal alliance with 
Turkey, we have no formal or informal arrangement with Iran. 
That leaves open the possibility that Iran might be used to outflank 
Turkey, and a Russian attack might pass down toward the Persian 
Gulf, first through Iran, and then Iraq to the Persian Gulf. If 
there were a strong Turkish Army to the West, capable of receiving 
extensive reenforcements, particularly in air power, I very much 
doubt that any Russian commanding officer would want to send 
forces down there within range of Turkish air fields. 
Again there is the question: "Would the Turks be prepared 
to let us use their airfields?" That too depends upon imponderable 
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factors-the development of relations between the Turks and their 
neighbors and between the Turks and ourselves. As matters are 
now moving, I think it is not probable, but very possible, that we 
would be in a position, through the arms which we have given to 
Turkey, to make that outflanking movement too risky for the 
Soviet to undertake. 
Well, what are the hopes, what are the fears of the moment? 
Obviously, from the Turkish point of view, the hope is that if they 
are involved in a war with Russia, the only nation they fear, it will 
be a war of a kind which will inevitably involve both Great Britain 
and the United States. As far as the United States is concerned, 
we hope that our arming of Turkey will deter the Russians from 
an attack, and that the contingency against which we are preparing 
will never arise. 
And finally, I think we have to face this question, "How 
long will the type of arrangements, which we now have, last? Is it 
just a short-term policy or is it a long-term policy?" Long term 
policies depend upon community of interests between nations ; not 
sentiments, but common interests. And, as I said earlier, our in­
terest is not to occupy and administer Turkey, but to make Turkey 
strong enough to occupy and administer herself and prevent any out­
side power from taking over. We want an independent nation that 
will add to our security in the Near East. It has to be Turkey, be­
cause it is from Turkey that the oil, which is essential to our having 
any effective allies, can be defended. So with this community of in­
terest which exists, namely, survival of the Turks as an independent 
nation (that interest being the same for them as for us) I think 
that there is every ptospect of a long duration to the present type of 
informal alliance. 
And I can say this as a final word. Last summer I talked 
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ing the heads of the Naval and Army missions in Turkey, the Am­
bassadors and many of the Ministers of the Turkish Cabinet. 
Thus far our people, military and civilian, have been operating 
with a high degree of good sense and tact and understanding, 
pushing ahead with their work, obviously not interested in taking 
over Turkey as a conquered state. They have been doing all this 
with such success that there is not yet any serious cloud on the 
horizon as far as Turko-American relations are concerned. 
Turkey is important because of its position,, because of its 
morale, because of its point of view. It is important to the United 
States and the United States is important to Turkey. Our informal 
alliance is working and is working very well indeed, and I think we 
have every reason to be satisfied with the present state of affairs. 
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